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Defining Taxable Consumption: A Comment on
Personal Insurance Premiums
WILLIAM D. POPKIN*
Professor Andrews has reminded us that taxable income is a proxy for
identifying taxable savings and consumption' and that the most pressing
definitional problem is to distinguish taxable from nontaxable consump-
tion, because a deduction for savings only postpones taxation until the
time when the savings are consumed, but tax exempt consumption will
never be taxeed.2 The standards for defining taxable consumption,
however, are vague and sometimes controversial. For example, on the in-
come side, a discussion of fringe benefits offers as the standard for defin-
ing taxable consumption the taxpayer's "incremental well-being . . .
above some base level of welfare," but then notes that "there is no uni-
quely preferable base to select."' 3 Similar uncertainty exists on the deduc-
tion side. A proponent of the medical expense deduction suggests that
such expenses "reflect differences in need rather than choices among
gratifications" but that the "distinction holds, to be sure, only as a
general matter."' 4 And an analysis of charitable contributions urges that
taxable consumption include only "private consumption of divisible
goods and services." 5 Not unexpectedly, these justifications for deduc-
ting medical expenses and charitable contributions have been sharply
challenged.
6
The reason for the vagueness and controversy is not hard to find. The
standards for defining taxable consumption give content to the principle
of the fair tax base, which defines the individual's obligation to con-
tribute to public expenditures. Like any important political principle, the
fair tax base must be derived from the community's conception of the in-
dividual and the individual's relationship to the state, issues on which a
precise and uncontroversial consensus is difficult to obtain. Although
proof of a cause and effect relationship between political concepts and
specific tax provisions seems impossible, we can hypothesize several
*A.B. 1958; LL.B. 1961, Harvard. Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
'Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REv.
1113, 1114 (1974).
1Id., at 1115-16.
SNote, Federal Income Taxation of Employer Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141,
1147 (1976).
'Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 336
(1972).
*Id., at 346.
'See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 21 (1973).
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ways in which such concepts might affect the tax system. For example, in
a socialist society where people are expected to function more as com-
munity members than as self-willed individuals, we might expect more
reliance on sales taxes, which cannot take account of variations in in-
dividual circumstances, than on income or consumption taxes, which can
make such adjustments.7 And in a society as individualistic as ours, we
might expect private decisions about whether or not to work in the
market economy to be respected by excluding from the base leisure in-
come (that is, the psychic benefit of leisure) and income from personal ser-
vices performed for oneself;8 and we might also expect charitable con-
tributions to be deductible on the theory that public goods do not provide
enough individual gratification to be subject to tax.9
This essay suggests that the standard for defining taxable consump-
tion which best explains our existing tax system and which seems most
compatible with our individualistic traditions is one that includes only
expenses that express particular life-style choices. The strategy followed
is to examine the existing rules dealing with personal expenses, with
primary focus on arguments for and against the deduction of personal in-
surance premiums. This analysis indicates that the standard for defining
taxable consumption as expenses for particular life-style choices has con-
siderable explanatory power.
There are two possible objections to this strategy. The first objection is
that the rules produced by the political process, especially as it applies to
the tax law, are not principled. This cynicism seems to overstate a
legitimate point. Political compromise, like any bargain, may be devoid
of an animating principle. But legislation, no less than the common law,
often proceeds in a piecemeal fashion to produce a principled pattern. Up
close, the pattern can easily be missed but from a distance a distinct
outline is often discernable.
The second objection is that the principle uncovered by an analysis of
existing rules may be unpalatable. However, the purpose of this analysis
is not to demonstrate either the wisdom or inevitability of a particular
standard for defining taxable consumption. The purpose is to expose the
operating principle to public debate. Indeed, there is an important rela-
tionship between rejecting the view that the political process is unprin-
cipled and the rejection of any particular principle. As long as there is no
effort to find patterns in the political process, the results are likely to re-
tain greater vitality than would be the case if there were open discussion
of underlying principles.
7Perhaps this helps to explain Professor Galbraith's willingness to rely on sales taxes; J.
GALBRAITH. THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 237-39 (1969).
'Although there is no constitutional obstacle to requiring work as a form of taxation, see
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916), such a tax would be very unpopular. The relationship
of welfare recipients to the government, however, differs sharply from that of taxpayers
and work requirements are a standard feature of welfare programs. Cf Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309, 343 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contrasting treatment of taxpayers and
welfare recipients).
9See Andrews, supra note 4, at 346.
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Personal insurance premiums buy protection against personal risks,
the most common examples of which are insurance against loss of per-
sonal property, term life insurance,10 and nonoccupational medical and
disability insurance." The current tax law treats these premiums, with
the exception of medical insurance premiums, 2 as nondeductible per-
sonal expenses,1 3 in sharp contrast to business insurance premiums
which are usually deductible.1 4 Before developing a theory to justify this
treatment of personal insurance premiums, however, we must focus on
two preliminary issues. First, we must address the question whether an
expenditure is consumption, in the sense of being a current expense, or
savings. If an expenditure is savings, not consumption, it is not deduc-
tible when incurred even if it falls in the income-producing sphere of an in-
dividual's activities, 5 but is deductible as a cost when the asset is sold or
otherwise disposed of. For example, an expenditure for a building is not
deductible when incurred, whether or not the building is used as a per-
sonal residence or place of business, but would be deducted in arriving at
gross income when the building was sold. The distinction between sav-
ings for income-producing and for personal purposes is, to be sure, an im-
portant one because the availability of depreciation and loss deductions
often turns on that distinction. 6 But the sharpest disputes are over the
deductibility of expenditures that are for consumption because an expen-
diture for consumption is deductible when incurred or not at all.
Second, the question whether the expenditure falls in the personal or
"Only term life insurance is discussed because life insurance with a cash value includes a
savings feature as well as pure insurance protection.
"Disability insurance compensates the insured for loss of use of part of the body or loss
of income resulting from sickness or accident. It is "nonoccupational" if the disability does
not arise out of and in the course of employment. Workers Compensation is the best known
occupational disability insurance.
"I.R.C. § 213(e)(1)(C).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(1), (2) (1958) (life and personal property insurance).
Concerning nonoccupational disability insurance, see I.T. 1265, I-1 C.B. 193 (1922); I.T.
2888, XIV-.1 C.B. 54, 56 (1935); Rev. Rul. 55-331, 1955-1 C.B. 271; Rev. Rul. 58-480, 1958-2
C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 70-394, 1970-2 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul 71-73, 1971-1 C.B. 52; Rev. Rul. 75-48,
1975-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 75-149, 1975-1 CB 64; Blaess v. Commissioner, 28 T.C 710, 717
(1957).
But see I.T. 3607, 1943 C.B. 110 (nonoccupational disability insurance premium is a
deductible business expense). This ruling does not explicitly describe the disability in-
surance as nonoccupational, but a recent case McGowan v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 599(1977)) characterized the insurance in I.T. 3607 as the same as that dealt with in Rev. Rul.
75-148; 1975-1 C.B. 64, which involved nonoccupational disability insurance. See also Rev.
Rul. 55-264, 1955-1 C.B. 11 (premiums deductible if insurance proceeds replace overhead
expenses).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1958); § 1.446-1(c)(i)(1957); § 1.461-1(a)(1)(1957). See Louis S.
Cohn, Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1281, 1284 (1928) (premium deductible when paid
even though insurance contract cancelled in the following year; refunded premium taxable
in year of refund). Occasionally, business insurance premiums are capital costs; see infra
note 32.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1), (2)(1957).
"I.R.C. § 167(a) limits depreciation deductions to business and income-producing proper-
ty. I.R.C. § 165(c) allows loss deductions for business and income-producing property, but
allows deductions for personal losses only in certain situations.
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income-producing sphere of activity must be considered before we can ex-
plore the deeper meaning of taxable consumption. The definition of tax-
able consumption clearly excludes income-producing expenses because
they do not provide the taxpayer with personal gratification. The
interesting problems only arise when we must decide whether a personal
expense ought to be included in the tax base. As it turns out, an analysis
of personal insurance premiums provides an excellent opportunity to
distinguish between consumption and savings and between personal and
income-producing expenses, as well as an occasion to consider the defini-
tion of taxable consumption.
CONSUMPTION OR SAVINGS
The term "consumption" usually refers to "personal" expenses rather
than expenses incurred for income production. 17 However,
"consumption" also refers to "expenses" as contrasted with capital
costs. Capital costs, unlike expenses, provide value for the taxpayer's
future use18 and are taxable when incurred because savings are subject to
income tax whether or not they are allocated to the taxpayer's personal
or income-producing sphere of activity. Insurance premiums would be
capital costs if they were considered costs of producing future insurance
proceeds. In that event, the premiums would not be deductible when in-
curred but their deduction would be deferred until the investment in the
insurance policy became useless or was disposed of. If an insured loss did
not occur, the investment would no longer be useful and the premiums
would be deducted when the period of insurance coverage expired. 19 If an
insured loss occured, the investment would be disposed of in exchange for
insurance proceeds and the cost of the insurance would be deducted from
the insurance proceeds,2" unless the taxpayer elected to defer tax by
reinvesting the proceeds in similar property. 2' If such an election were
'TSee, e.g., Andrews, supra note 1, at 1114.
"The Supreme Court has stated that the test is whether there is a "separate and distinct
additional asset." Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354
(1971). As a descriptive test, however, this phrase misses the mark. For example, expen-
ditures which provide intangible value may not satisfy this test, but are often capital
costs. See, e.g., Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), where the Court required
capitalization of appraisal fees incurred by a corporation to acquire its own stock, even
though such stock is not an asset after the corporation acquired it. Moreover, this test
may be misleading if it equates a capital expenditure with the creation of a physical asset
or an asset recognized by property law. See Gunn, The Requirement that a Capital Expen-
diture Create or Enhance an Asset 15 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 443 (1974).
"I.R.C. § 165(c)(1), (2). The difference between a current deduction and deferral of a
deduction until a later time when the insurance coverage expires may be inconsequential if
the effect is only to defer the deduction one year. Nonetheless, the distinction between an
expense and a cost is important because insurance premiums which are costs would not
necessarily be deducted in the year coverage expired if the taxpayer elects to defer tax by
reinvesting the insurance proceeds; see I.R.C. § 1033.
"OCf Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279, 286 (cost of put reduces sales proceeds).
" I.R.C. § 1033. Deferral of the deduction until the proceeds are collected or until the
[Vol. 54:389
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made, the cost of the insurance would be carried over as part of the cost
of the replacement property. 2
Insurance premiums incurred to protect against business risks, are
usually treated as current expenses,23 not capital costs. The choice
between viewing insurance premiums as expenses or capital costs is not
completely obvious, however. As a general proposition, some types of ex-
penditures are clearly capital costs, such as savings account deposits,
because they acquire a separate item of property with a long life.24 And
we have little trouble deciding that an expenditure for a roof shingle,
though a long-lived asset, is a deductible expense incurred to maintain a
building.25 It is often unclear, however, whether an expenditure ought to
be considered for tax purposes as the cost of a separate long-lived item of
property or as an expenditure which maintains another item of
property. 6 How, for example, should expenditures to correct land
drainage problems be treated; do such expenditures maintain the tax-
payer's income-producing capacity or acquire separate income-producing
assets with future value to the taxpayer. 27 Similarly, insurance premiums
might be viewed as expenses to maintain income production or as capital
costs of the insurance policy with a potential for future income produc-
tion.28
replacement property is disposed of will probably result in the income being taxed as
capital gains because the insurance proceeds or the proceeds realized on disposition of the
replacement property is likely to be taxed as a sale or exchange of a capital asset. I.R.C. §
1231(a). However, if the proceeds replace lost profits, they are taxed as ordinary income;
Shakertown Corp. v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 625, 628 (6th Cir. 1960).
22.R.C. § 1033 (b).23See supra note 14. But see infra note 32, citing examples of business insurance
premiums which are capital costs.21See Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971) ("a
separate and distinct additional asset").
2 United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968) ("Certainly the expense in-
curred in the replacement of a broken windowpane, a damaged lock, or a door .... may well
be treated as a deductible repair expenditure even though the benefits endure quite beyond
the current year.").26See Shugerman, Basic Criteria for Distinguishing Revenue Charges from Capital Ex-
penditures in Income Tax Computations, 49 MICH. L. REV. 213, 271 (1956).2 7Mt. Morris Drive-in Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 272, 275 (1955), aff'd, 238
F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956) (deduction disallowed - "acquisition and construction of a capital
asset which petitioner had not previously had, namely, a new drainage system."). But cf
American Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 361, 376-77 (1948), affd, 177 F.2d 200
(6th Cir. 1949) (deduction allowed); Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.
635, 642-43 (1950) (deduction allowed); Oberman Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 471, 482-83 (1967) (deduction allowed).21The question might be avoided if the tax consequences of distinguishing between a cur-
rent expense and a capital cost are so small that making the distinction is not worth the ef-
fort. There are two rules which implement that policy. First, small recurring expenditures
are deductible as current expenses even though they acquire long-lived assets when the dif-
ference between depreciation of capital costs and current expensing is negligible. Cincin-
nati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 572 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Second, expen-
ditures are generally deductible if they acquire assets with a life that does not extend
substantially beyond the taxable year in which they are incurred. Treas. Reg. §
1.461-1(a)(1), (2) (1957).
However, when these rules of convenience result in distortion of income, the expen-
1979]
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This question must be resolved by reference to common understanding
of the function of the expenditure for the taxpayer. Business insurance
premiums are usually deductible expenses in the year they are paid29
because they are commonly understood to maintain income-producing
potential, not to provide the taxpayer with value lasting beyond the year
when the premiums are paid. Indeed, the last thing the taxpayer wants is
for the loss to occur and the proceeds to be collected.30
Occasionally, however, insurance premiums are incurred primarily to
produce future value and should be deducted only from the insurance pro-
ceeds when they are collected. This is clearly true of life insurance with a
cash value, 3 but it is also true of life insurance on a debtor's life. Such in-
surance should be viewed primarily as assuring the creditor that the debt
will be collected in the future and the premiums should therefore be costs
of debt collection.3 2 In this respect, life insurance premiums on a debtor's
life are similar to the cost of a put,3 3 which allows the taxpayer to sell pro-
perty at a price fixed by contract so that a decline in value will not pro-
duce a loss. The cost of the put is not deductible when incurred but in-
stead reduces the proceeds of sale of the property disposed of by exer-
cising the put,3 4 or, if the put is not exercised, the cost is deducted when
the right to exercise the put expires.3 5 Puts, like insurance on a debtor's
life, provide future value realizable upon disposition of property, rather
ditures should be capitalized. Thus, certain prepaid expenses with utility extending no
longer than the next taxable year are not always deductible. I.R.C. §§ 461(g), 464(a). For
the reasons given in supra note 19, the distinction between a deductible expense and a cost
may have significant tax consequences in the case of insurance premiums.29See supra note 14.30This attitude helps to explain why the taxpayer can defer tax if he reinvests the in-
surance proceeds in similar property. I.R.C. § 1033 (a).31I.R.C. § 72 (e)(1}{B). All the premiums are deductible costs even though the portion
allocable to current insurance protection should be a nondeductible personal expense for
current insurance protection; see UNITED STATES TREAS. DEPT.. BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM 60 (1977) (hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS).
"Compare Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974) (collection costs are capital costs); with Rev. Rul. 70-524, 1970-1
C.B. 31.
There are often grounds for treating insurance premiums on a debtor's life as capital
costs independent of their status as collection costs. First, there may be a meaningful right
of reimbursement of the premiums from the debtor. G.C.M. 14375, XIV-1 C.B. 52-54;
Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 20, 26 (1951). Contra, Charleston Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 253, 261 (1953), affd, 213 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1954); Estate of Hall v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C. at 27 (dissenting opinion). Cf Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-2 C.B. 43 ("in-
surance" payments which are withdrawable if no loss occurs are capital costs). Second, the
insurance on a debtor's life may have a cash surrender value which exceeds the premiums
paid. United States v. Mellinger, 228 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1956). Cf Jones v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C. 249, 263-64 (1964), vacated and remanded, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9379 (3d Cir.
1964) (sale of remainder interests).
"I.T. 2266, V-1 C.B. 13 (1926).
34Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279, 286. However, if a put is bought on the same day as
the property to be used in exercising the option, the cost of the put is added to the cost of
the property, rather than to the cost of the proceeds realized on the disposition of property
pursuant to the put; I.R.C. § 1233 (c).
3I.R.C. 88 1233(a), (b).
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than assure the taxpayer that an income-producing activity will continue
despite a loss. With this exception, however, personal and business in-
surance premiums are expenses of maintaining the taxpayer's income in
the event a loss occurs, not costs of producing the insurance proceeds.
3 6
PERSONAL OR INCOME-PRODUCING EXPENSE
The discussion has so far suggested that insurance premiums are
usually expenses of maintaining income which would be threatened if the
insured risk materializes. Distinguishing personal from income-
producing expenses for tax purposes is complicated, however, by the re-
quirement that expenses "originating" in personal activities are personal
expenses even if they maintain the taxpayer's flow of income. The
leading case espousing the origin test is United States v. Gilmore,3 7 in
which a taxpayer incurred expenses to maintain his income-producing
property but was not allowed a deduction because the threat to his pro-
perty originated in a personal marital dispute with his wife. 8 The origin
test is not self-defining, however. It cannot be mechanically applied or
else it would be possible to trace most expenses back to some personal
choice in which an activity originated. The personal decision to engage in
a particular line of work, for example, is the remote physical cause of later
business expenses. The purport of the origin test is that the distinction
between income-producing and personal expenses depends on which deci-
sions made by the taxpayer are considered most appropriate for
characterizing a particular expense. Thus, the expenses in Gilmore are
considered personal because the earlier personal decisions leading to the
marital dispute are thought to dominate most subsquent related deci-
sions, including the decision to resist claims by a spouse to income-
producing property.3 9 By contrast, it is less certain that child care ex-
"The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that employee contributions to a disability
plan which is not "insurance" are costs which reduce taxable disability benefits; Rev. Rul.
54-2, 1954-1 C.B. 30. The Ruling incorrectly assumes that if there is no insurance there
must be a savings feature. But a savings feature exists only if payments in one year aug-
ment benefits in a later year. There is nothing in the cited ruling to suggest the presence of
a savings element even if the payment was not for "insurance." See Note, Taxation of
Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L. J. 222,
224, n. 7 (1954) (criticizing Rev. Rul. 54-2).
37372 U.S. 39 (1963).
"I at 47-48, 51-52.
"The implication of the Gilmore holding for deciding whether the expenditures should be
added to the cost of the threatened property were not fully understood in Gilmore v.
United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Calif. 1965), where the district court held that the
Supreme Court had not decided whether the expenses could be added to the cost of the re-
tained property. Despite some language suggesting that possibility, 372 U.S. at 52, the
thrust of the Supreme Court's opinion was that the personal origin of the expenditure
marked the expense as personal. That conclusion should prevent the expenditure from be-
ing related to income-production either as an expense or as a capital cost. Id. at 45-51. See
also Hinkle v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 670, 672 (1942).
Similar problems in deciding whether to allocate expenditures to personal or income-
producing activities and whether they are current expenses or capital costs arise con-
19791
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penses should be attributed to the taxpayer's earlier personal decision to
have children rather than to a later decision to work.4"
The application of the origin test to personal insurance premiums is
illustrated by the Revenue Rulings distinguishing taxes paid by an
employee for Unemployment Insurance, which are deductible because
they arise from carrying on trade or business, 41 from taxes paid for nonoc-
cupational disability insurance, which are not deductible because they
are personal expenses.4 2 Unemployment Compensation protects against
loss of income due to an economic slowdown.4 3 A deduction as a business
expense might therefore be allowed on the theory that the expense is in-
curred to maintain income. However, that analysis proves too inclusive;
it would allow a deduction for personal insurance premiums as well
because they also maintain income. An analysis which better explains the
distinction would follow the lead of the Gilmore case. It would find the
origin of expenses to maintain a flow of income from catastrophic loss in
the nature of the risk to the flow of income, not in the effort to retain the
income.4 4 But in what sense is the risk of economic slowdown a business
risk? The risk does not necessarily arise from any special attribute of the
taxpayer's employment, such as working in an industry which is be-
coming economically obsolete. The point is that the risk "originates"
cerning expenditures to establish a taxpayer's reputation. See Draper v. Commissioner,
26 T.C. 201 (1956) (deductible business expense); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933) (capital cost for business asset); Lloyd v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1932)
(personal expenditure); Kleinschmidt v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 921 (1949) (same).4 0Compare Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039-40 (1939), affd no opinion, 113
F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) with Feld, Deductibility of Expenses for Child Care and Household
Services; New Section 214, 27 TAX L. REV. 415, 426 (1972). Cf FLowers v. Commissioner,
326 U.S. 465, 473 (1945) (commuting expenses incurred as a result of taxpayer's desire to
live apart from work, not his desire to work).
"Rev. Rul. 75-48, 1975-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 75-156, 1975-1 C.B. 66. Business taxes are
deductible under I.R.C. § 164(a). If the insurance payment is not a tax but pays for in-
surance against the same type of risk as Unemployment Insurance, it is a deductible
business expense under I.R.C. § 162(a); I.T. 2888, XIV-1 C.B. 54, 56 (1935); I.T. 3096,
1937-2 C.B. 81; I.T. 3085, 1937-1 C.B. 64.
If there is a savings element in contributions to an Unemployment Compensation plan,
the expenditures are capital costs and the proceeds are taxable only if they exceed the cost.
Rev. Rul. 59-5, 1959-1 C.B. 12; Rev. Rul. 57-383, 1957-2 C.B. 44; I.T. 1918, 111-1 C.B. 121
(1924).
'
2Rev. Rul. 75-48, 1975-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 75-148, 1975-1 C.B. 64; Rev. Rul. 75-149,
1975-1 C.B. 64. In McGowan v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 599 (1977), the court held that the
Rhode Island tax in Rev. Rul. 75-148 was an income tax and therefore deductible even if it
did not originate with a trade or business. The IRS originally accepted the McGowan deci-
sion for Rhode Island only, IR-1742, 1/28/77, but then extended the decision to New York,
New Jersey, and California, IR-1967,3/10/78. Nonoccupational disability insurance
premiums which are not taxes are nondeductible personal expenses. See supra note 13.
"3Freeman, Able to Work andAvailable for Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123, 124 (1945). Personal
activities may be the immediate occasion for losing a job without disqualifying the
claimant, but the claimant is entitled to benefits only if he or she retains an attachment to
the labor market which does not generate enough jobs. Id at 129-30; Menard, Refusal of
Suitable Work, 55 YALE L.J. 134, 135, 147 (1945); Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary
Leaving and Misconduct, 55 YALE L.J. 147, 148-53 (1945).
"United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963).
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with the business if it is generally viewed as a hazard of doing business.
Thus, fire insurance is business insurance whether or not carrying on the
business increases the risk of fire and Workers Compensation is business
insurance whether or not the covered loss arises from any peculiar risk of
the taxpayer's employment activity.'5 Similarly, the risk of unemploy-
ment due to an economic slowdown originates from the employee's
business activities because it is considered a normal hazard of being an
employee.
Nonoccupational disability insurance protects against risks
originating from personal activities in the same sense that Unemploy-
ment Compensation protects against a risk arising from business. In
some instances, the link between the risk and personal activities may be
very clear. Disability insurance for a taxpayer who engages in mountain
climbing is as much an expense of that hazardous activity as the price
paid for picks and shovels. 4 But disability insurance usually protects
against the risks which befall everyone in their daily personal activities
in more or less the same way, without regard to the specific activities.
The risks "originate" from personal activity because the risks of sickness
and accident against which'disability insurance protects are viewed as a
normal hazard of everyday personal life. Similarly, life, personal prop-
erty, and nonoccupational medical insurance also protect against risks
which are considered normal hazards of personal life. The premiums are
therefore personal consumption.41
TAXABLE OR NONTAXABLE PERSONAL CONSUMPTION
Once we conclude that personal insurance premiums are personal con-
sumption, we are ready to consider whether they are taxable consump-
tion. We already are accustomed to the idea that personal medical
expenses should be excluded from taxable consumption pursuant to a
standard that excludes personal expenses arising from need rather than
41 Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of
Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wisc. L. REV. 57. 69-71 (decline of "peculiar risk" doc-
trine).
"6Vickrey distinguished between the portion of the premium allocable to the risk and that
portion required to defray expenses of the insurance company. He argued that the latter
were personal expenses if the taxpayer's personal activity involved a special risk. W.
VICKREY. AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 63-64 (1947).
'41f personal insurance premiums were related to income-production, their deduction
would be disallowed if the personal insurance proceeds were tax exempt. Rev. Rul. 66-262,
1966-2 C.B. 105. This justification for disallowing the deduction can be best explained by
considering a hypothetical involving exempt life insurance proceeds. If the proceeds were
used to purchase an annuity, the cost would be deducted from future income, see I.R.C. §
72(b). and the income shielded by the cost would never be taxed. The deduction for in-
surance premiums should therefore be disallowed when the proceeds are tax exempt
because the flow of income shielded by the invested proceeds is exempt. Current law ex
empts proceeds from most personal insurance. See I.R.C. § 101 (a) (life insurance proceeds
tax exempt); §§ 104(a)(3) and 105(b) (medical insurance proceeds tax exempt); §§ 104(a)(3)
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gratification.48 Admittedly, personal insurance premiums cannot be
analogized to medical expenses on the theory that they arise from need.
However, a closer analysis of the notion of taxable gratification will sug-
gest why the premiums might not be taxable consumption.
We are all engaged in personal activities which, no matter what we do,
carry the risks against which personal insurance protects. An accident
prompts the statement, "That's life," and only occasionally do we at-
tribute the misfortune to some personal activity peculiar to the taxpayer.
The issue is whether the origin of insurance in the general undifferen-
tiated personal life of a taxpayer is an argument against including the
premiums in taxable consumption. Put another way, is the definition of
taxable consumption limited to particular life-style choices? This stan-
dard for defining taxable consumption is not, of course, a necessary in-
ference from the more general political concept of a fair tax base. But it
deserves our careful consideration, given its close relationship to our
historical attachment to the idea that the distinguishing mark of the in-
dividual personality is choice of particular life-style, what Boorstin
calls the choice of "consumption communities.' 49
Admittedly, this intuition might not survive a trend towards a more
communitarian, less individualistic view of the relationship of individual
to society. 0 Any change in philosophical attitude, however, would simply
demonstrate the questionable validity of this analysis in the future, not
deny its accuracy in explaining current law. Moreover, individualism
might persist as the dominant strain in defining equitable taxation,
where the issue is fairness in withdrawing private resources for public
use, whatever may be its more general fate in shaping government.
regulatory or expenditure policy. The intuition that taxable consumption
includes only expenditures for particular life-style choices is therefore
and 105(c), (d) (disability proceeds excluded from income, except that proceeds are only
partially excluded if employer buys the disability insurance for the employees as a tax-free
fringe benefit). With one exception proceeds of personal property insurance are taxed in
the same manner as the lost item which they replace. Proceeds compensating for the loss of
property itself are taxed as an amount realized on the disposition of property; McCabe v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1745, 1748 (1970). The exception is the exclusion of reimbursements
for living expenses exceeding normal living expenses when a casualty prevents the tax-
payer from living in his principal residence. I.R.C. § 123.
However, if the premiums are personal consumption, rather than being related to pro-
duction of the insurance proceeds, their deduction should not be disallowed just because
the proceeds are tax-exempt. Cf Hughes v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 566 (1975) (dissenting
opinion) (expenses to move to foreign country deductible under § 217 even though foreign
personal service income is exempt from United States tax, because the deduction for
moving expenses is not a deduction for income-producing expenses).
"See supra note 4. The extra personal exemption for blindness is another example or a
deduction which adjusts the tax base for diminished gratification. I.R.C. § 151(d). On the
income side, the exclusion of disability benefits is sometimes justified on this basis; see
Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952).
"D. BOORSTIN. THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE. 89-90 (1974 Vintage ed.)
50R. UNGER. KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 236-95 (1975); Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1725-37 (1976).
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sufficiently plausible to warrant looking more closely at existing law to
determine its explanatory power."
General Sales Taxes
The law allows a taxpayer to deduct sales taxes imposed on a broad
range of items.5 2 This deduction is usually defended as an effort to main-
tain federal neutrality with respect to state and local taxes.5 3 However, it
can also be defended on the basis of a standard limiting the tax base to
expenditures for particular life-style choices. The argument for this con-
clusion comes into focus if we analyze the weaknesses and strengths of
the argument that the general sales tax should be deductible because it is
a forced payment extracted from the consumer. Certainly the fact that a
payment is not voluntary is some evidence that it does not provide the
consumer with sufficient gratification to be taxable consumption.
Casualty losses, for example, do not qualify as taxable consumption be-
cause they are inv6luntary," but losses on property voluntarily given to
charity are not deductible."5 There are important qualifications to the
deductibility of forced payments, however, which shed light on the defini-
tion of taxable consumption. First, deduction for all forced payments
would destroy the origin test.5 7 Mr. Gilmore was in a sense forced by his
wife's lawsuit to pay lawyers' fees to defend his property but the origin of
the expenditure in his personal life justified disallowing the deduction. 5
Second, selective sales taxes are forced exactions originating in the tax-
payer's consumption decisions and would be deductible if all forced
payments could be deducted. But if forced payments are characterized
"Surrey suggests that defining consumption is not relevant under an income tax. S. SUR-
REY. supra note 6, at 20-21. However, deciding whether employer-provided fringe benefits
are taxable income inevitably involves a definition of taxable consumption, see Note, supra
note 3, at 1144-48, and there is no reason why the definition should be relevant only to
receipts and not expenditures.121.R.C. § 164(b}(2)(A).
"A deduction for all state sales taxes appeared in the Int. Rev. Code of 1913, ch. 16, § II
G(b), 38 Stat. 174. In 1964, the deduction was limited to general sales taxes. The Senate
Finance Committee explicitly based the deduction on the importance of maintaining
neutrality among major sources of state revenue. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 54
(1963). The point in the text is that the deduction may, as at least one other commentator
has noted, be justified by reference to considerations of fairness as well as federal-state
fiscal relations. See Brazer, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes under the In-
dividual Income Tax, in 1 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 407, 416-17 (House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.. Comm. Print 1959) (most families lack freedom to choose
among taxed and untaxed items).
"The dominant economic view is that such taxes are borne by consumers. Due, Sales and
Excise Taxes, 15 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOC. SCI. 550, 553 (1968). Unlike a selective
sales tax, however, a general sales tax affects consumption only by reducing income. R.
MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE. PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 446-48 (1973); P.
SAMUELSON. ECONOMICS 445 (9th ed. 1973).
"I.R.C. 4 165(c)(3).
"Withers v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 900 (1978).
"See supra note 37-40 and text accompanying.
"372 U.S. at 42. 49.
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for tax purposes by reference to their origin, both general and selective
sales taxes would be taxable consumption because they originate in the
taxpayer's decision to consume in accordance with his particular
preferences."5 General sales taxes can be deductible, therefore, only if
they differ from selective sales taxes in some manner that is significant
for defining taxable consumption.
The critical difference between general and selective sales taxes lies in
the fact that a selective sales tax can be avoided by not indulging a
preference for the particular consumption item subject to the tax, but a
general sales tax can be avoided only by foregoing consumption
altogether. Even if the general sales tax falls on something less than all
consumption, it can be avoided only by choosing to forego consumption
of a large group of items. The argument for deducting the general sales
tax rests on a judgment that it asks too much of a taxpayer to avoid a
burden falling indiscriminately on a wide range of consumption items
rather than on particular consumption items.
The point is similar to one frequently made in the context of conditions
on receipt of welfare. A welfare claimant may obtain benefits conditioned
on accepting burdens or may choose to reject the benefits, but courts
have sometimes refused to consider this choice "voluntary" and have
prohibited imposition of the condition. 60 Describing the choice as "in
voluntary" is not meant to describe mental processes but to pass nor-
mative judgment on the nature of the choice.6' In the tax context, this
judgment would lead to the view that a condition on consumption in the
form of a forced payment that cannot reasonably be avoided should not
be taxable consumption.2 This principle, as it applies to a burden falling
on a wide range of consumption items, translates into the standard for
defining taxable consumption discussed earlier, that only expenses for
"Both general and selective sales taxes affect different consumers differently, de-
pending on their particular preferences. This can be seen graphically from constructing a
demand curve from the tangency of budget lines to an individual's indifference curves. The
demand curve depends on the location of the particular individual's indifference curve
tangent to the budget line created by the tax. See D. WATSON. PRICE THEORY AND ITS USES
103 (3d ed. 1972).
6 Hagans v. Wyman, 399 F. Supp. 421, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (welfare recipient's decision
to accept rent payment conditioned on sacrificing future welfare benefits is not a "volun-
tary" consent to reduction of future payments). But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,
317-18, 324 (1971) (welfare can be conditioned on home visit).
"Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 506-10 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("involun-
tary as a matter of law" not really a question of "voluntariness," but of permissible condi-
tions imposed on exercise of privilege).
"
2Similar reasoning underlies the view that income should be adjusted for inflation, even
after the costs of generating income have been adjusted so that costs and receipts are
measured in dollars having the same purchasing power. The effects of inflation on income
appear to fall indiscriminately on all consumption and therefore call for some adjustment
of the tax burden. See Aawn. Inflation and the Income Tax in INFLATION AND THE INCOME
TAX 6, 23-26 (H. Aaron ed. 1976). The argument for adjusting the tax burden for inflation
is weaker, however, than the argument for deducting general sales taxes because inflation
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particular life style choices are taxable consumption. 63 The choice of par-
ticular items is "voluntary" and costs imposed only on those items can
fairly be included in the tax base, but a decision to consume a wide range
of items cannot reasonably be considered "voluntary" and the cost of a
burden on that choice is therefore not taxable consumption.
Interest on Loans for Current Personal Consumption
The deduction of interest on loans for current personal consumption64
can also be defended on the ground that it is not taxable consumption. To
see why that is so, we must distinguish loans for current personal con-
sumption, such as a vacation, from loans to acquire personal assets, such
as a residence.
The use of personal assets clearly provides the owner with taxable con-
sumption analogous to rent.6 5 That does not mean, however, that interest
on loans to acquire such assets should be a nondeductible personal ex-
pense. Expenses to produce personal consumption are nondeductible per-
sonal expenses when the value they produce equals the expense. If there
is a discrepancy between the expense and the value produced, the correct
tax result is obtained only by including the consumption in income and
deducting the expense incurred to produce that income. For example, if
interest is $100 and gross rental value is $90, the correct result is a $10
loss, produced by a $100 deduction and a $90 gross income. Disallowing
the $100 deduction would overstate the taxpayer's income. If gross ren-
tal value is $110, there should be $10 net gain, which is avoided if gross
income excludes the $110 rental value from income, 66 even if the interest
is not deductible.67 Disallowing the interest deduction can only be
justified as an effort to include some or all of the rental value of the pro-
perty in the tax base, thereby reducing the discrepancy between bor-
rowers and renters. Because the underlying problem is the exclusion of
the rental value from income, however, this solution will discriminate in
favor of taxpayers who finance the acquisition of personal assets out of
affects different consumption items differently.
"See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra. A deduction for selective sales taxes im-
posed at a rate less than the general sales tax can be justified on the ground that the selec-
tive sales tax is avoidable only at the price of paying a higher tax. I.R.C. § 164(b)(2)(C)
(sales tax on certain items deductible if less than general sales tax rate). The deduction of
selective sales taxes is also justified if the taxed items are necessities, which cannot be
"voluntarily" foregone.
6'I.R.C. § 163(a).
"
5Andrews, supra note 1, at 1155-59.
"This problem also arises in the case of bargain sales to employees. Treas. Reg. §
1.61-2(d) (1977) (taxing bargain sales); but see Proposed Fringe Benefit Regulations, 40
Fed. Reg. 41118, 41120 (1975)(example 3).
7White, Proper Income Tax Treatment of Deductions for Personal Expense, in 1 TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 365, 366 (House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Comm. Print 1959); Andrews, supra note 4, at 376 n.116.
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savings, as a result of their being permitted to exclude rental value from
income. 8
When interest is paid on loans for current personal consumption, the
analysis of the interest deduction raises very different issues. The in-
terest should be nondeductible personal consumption only to the extent
it produces an equivalent return in personal consumption. However,
unlike interest on loans to acquire personal assets which produce value
that should be taxable income, it is by no means clear that interest on
loans to finance current personal consumption produces taxable con-
sumption. If, for example, an individual borrows $1000 to pay for a vaca-
tion, it is far from certain that the individual's taxable consumption
should be $1000 plus interest, rather than $1000. Unquestionably, the
borrower has obtained something he did not have before, namely a vaca-
tion now rather than later. But the "nowness" of consumption is not
necessarily an item of taxable consumption.
We might argue that the interest measures taxable consumption on the
theory that current consumption foregoes future income in the amount of
the interest paid and foregone income is good evidence of the value of tax-
able consumption. 9 There are two defects in this argument, however.
First, foregone income is good evidence of value only when the income is
foregone at the same time that the consumption is enjoyed, as when a
taxpayer enjoys his home rather than renting it. Second, the ability to
value consumption does not demonstrate that it ought to be taxed.
We might argue against taxing such value on the ground that the in-
dividual who finances current consumption out of savings enjoys the
same acceleration of consumption as the borrower, but is not taxed on
that value. However, we often encounter situations where some con-
sumer surplus is tax exempt but equivalent value is taxed if it is paid for
by the taxpayer. The "nowness" of current consumption might therefore
be taxable consumption even though self-financing consumers would
avoid tax on this value.70
A conclusion about taxing the value of consuming now rather than
later can only be reached, therefore, by squarely confronting the question
whether "nowness" should be taxable consumption. The answer to that
question emerges from a consideration of the costs confronting a tax-
payer who is deciding when to consume. When a taxpayer decides
"
8This discrepancy now exists as a result of several Code provisions. I.R.C. § 189(a)
disallows deductions of construction period interest, even though self-financing builders
do not add this value to cost. This provision equalizes borrowers with taxpayers who buy
the asset from someone else. I.R.C. § 265(2) disallows an interest deduction to produce tax-
exempt income but self-financing taxpayers enjoy the exemption of the entire return on
the invested assets. See Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514, 519-20 (1930) (discrimination
between borrower and self-financer constitutional).
"Cf Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach
to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 883 (1974) ("psychic benefits" as
"income").
70See Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 461, 470 (1977).
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whether to consume now rather than later, he is confronted with an in-
terest cost or a cost in the form of foregone income which is proportional
to the price of the items. For example, if interest is 10%, the borrower
confronts a 10% increase over the price of the purchased items, whatever
the price. That burden, like the burden of a general sales tax, falls in-
discriminately on all consumption items and can be avoided only by
giving up consumption, not by sacrificing any particular consumption
item. The same'reasoning that excluded general sales taxes from taxable
consumption would therefore exclude from the tax base interest on loans
for current personal consumption.
Personal Insurance Premiums
At this point in the analysis, personal insurance premiums would be ex-
cluded from taxable consumption because they originate from risks
associated with the taxpayer's general personal activities, not particular
life-style choices. There is, however, another feature of personal insurance
which requires instead that the premiums be taxable consumption. Per
sonal insurance premiums are an expression of particular consumption
preferences because they indulge the taxpayer's preference for economic
security in the conduct of personal activities, even though the personal
activities from which the premiums originate are not an expression of a
particular life-style.7 1 The preference for security is as much an item of
taxable consumption as the choice of particular food, clothing, or
shelter.7 2 Personal insurance premiums should therefore be taxable con-
sumption because of what they buy for the taxpayer, not because of the
activity from which the expenditures originate.
Several objections might be made to including individual preference for
security in taxable consumption. First, security is a subjective state of
mind and no tax system can effectively measure the tax base subjec-
"An analogous argument can be made for not deducting general sales taxes if govern-
ment benefits received for tax payments coincided more or less with taxpayer preferences.
This argument for including sales taxes in the tax base is rejected by Professor Bittker on
the ground that preferences for government expenditures are not measured by taxes. Bit-
tker, Income Tax Deduction, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J. LAW
& ECON. 193, 200-01 (1973).
"See H. SIMONS. PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 97 (1938) ("[I]t seems hard to deny that ac-
quisition of property rights may mean increase of power, greater freedom, security,
prestige, and respectability. These are as much objectives of endeavor as are lapels on
one's coat or diamonds on shirt fronts.")
Security was a relevant factor in determining taxable income in the following cases:
United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 411, 453 (1973) (partnership income taxed to partners,
even though it was diverted by prior agreement to a pension plan trust, in part because
retirement income security is a benefit taxpayers often seek); United States v. Drescher,
179 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1950) (Clark, J., dissenting in part) (nonassignable annuity pro-
vided by employer taxable because security is taxable economic benefit); Egtvedt v.
United States, 112 Ct. Cl. 80, 95 (1948) (return on capital can be taxed because investment
provided security).
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tively.7 3 But eschewing a subjective measure of taxation is intended to
avoid the problem of making individual case by case determinations of
subjective enjoyment in defining the particular individual's tax base.74 A
consensus about subjective enjoyment is nonetheless embedded in the
idea that gratification should be taxed" and is used to determine whether
the U.S. dollar value of expenditures is the appropriate tax base. When
we can reasonably assume that in most instances subjective enjoyment is
far less than the taxpayer's expenditure, as in the case of medical ex-
penses and casualty losses, the taxpayer is allowed a deduction.76 Simi-
larly, when an expenditure is likely to be less than the enjoyment re-
ceived, we are reluctant to let the expenditure measure taxable consump-
tion, as in the case of employee bargain purchases. 7 And when expen-
ditures cannot be made in U.S. dollars, as in the case of income received
in nontransferable foreign currency by a taxpayer living abroad, the tax-
able amount must be measured by reference to the normal standard of
living of a U.S. resident living in the foreign country in order to approx-
imate the level of gratification enjoyed by the taxpayer.78 Subjective en-
joyment is therefore a necessary underlying principle in defining taxable
consumption,7 even though the objective market value of expenditures
usually measures the taxable amount.
Second, the enjoyment from security might be considered too intan-
gible to be taxed. Certainly no effort would be made to tax many of life's
intangible pleasures, such as watching sunsets. But all consumption pro-
duces intangible states of mind, whether the expenditure is for food,
73Andrews, supra note 4, at 336 ("The tax must be laid on the utilization of exchangeable
goods and services, at market prices, not on the ultimate satisfactions that particular tax-
payers may or may not achieve from them.").74 Occasionally, the taxpayer's individual life-style is relevant for determining the tax
base. See Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967) (subjective test used to determine whether hobby losses disallowed); Turner v.
Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 462 (1954) (a prize of nontransferable steamship tickets
valued at less than cost; taxpayers did not need such tickets in the ordinary course of their
lives). See also I.R.C. § 123 (certain insurance proceeds excluded from income if they ex-
ceed the taxpayer's normal living expenses).
"See supra note 4 and text accompanying.
161.R.C. § 213 (medical expense); I.R.C. § 165(c) (casualty losses). Cf McCoy v. Commis-
sioner, 38 T.C. 841 (1962) (car sold shortly after it was won as a prize; taxable value for
period of use less than the difference between market value when the prize was won and
the sales price). But see S. SURREY. supra note 6, at 21.
"See supra note 66.
"See Eder v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (P-H) 44, 156 (1944). The court said that it
measured the normal standard of living by the cost of items which U.S. citizens resident in
the foreign country normally bought, not items which the U.S. citizens would buy if living
in the United States. This is an essential difference because labor costs are often lower in
other countries and labor is frequently a substitute for machines-viz., a person to wash
clothes vs. a washing machine. In theory, the price of this basket of goods and services
would be priced in both U.S. dollars and foreign currency to provide the "tax" exchange
rate. In the Eder case, the court actually valued the nontransferable foreign currency at
one half the rate used for the transferable currency, which suggests something less than a
strict application of the court's theory.
"See Halperin, supra note 69, at 863, 881-85.
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clothing, shelter, or security. Whether the consumption should be taxed
depends on whether the enjoyment is achieved by an expenditure of
resources to which society can lay claim. Simply enjoying a sunset while
walking along a beach is an essentially private activity, but the enjoy-
ment is taxed to the extent it is reflected in the purchase price of a vaca-
tion seaside cottage. For the same reason, security acquired through pur-
chase of personal insurance is taxable consumption.
This rationale for taxing personal insurance premiums has broad im-
plications for the definition of taxable consumption. If the purchase of
security in the conduct of personal activities justifies taxing personal in-
surance premiums, then it seems unfair to allow the security derived
from wealth to go untaxed. Wealth is, of course, a stock, not a flow 0 and
it is difficult to impute a use value to wealth. But at least one country
made the effort through legislation, by adding a fixed percentage of
wealth to the individual's income tax base.81 Admittedly, a similar provi-
sion would pose constitutional problems in the United States 2 and the
administrative burdens of ascertaining and measuring wealth are for-
midable.8 3 Nonetheless, if an effort to tax the security from wealth is not
made, 4 the fairness of taxing personal insurance premiums can be ques-
tioned because taxable consumption arising from different sources would
be taxed differently.8
CONCLUSION
The discussion of personal insurance premiums opens up a wide range
of fundamental questions about the tax base. The major substantive con-
clusions are (1) that premiums for personal insurance are current ex-
penses to maintain a flow of income, rather than capital costs of pro
ducing insurance proceeds; (2) that the premiums originate from the tax-
"Andrews, supra note 1, at 1169-70.
"Before Sweden adopted a separate wealth tax, they imputed income to wealth by
adding one-sixtieth of the taxpayer's wealth to the income tax base. M. NORR. F. DUFFY &
H. STERNER. WORLD TAX SERIES: TAXATION IN SWEDEN, 111.2, at 619-20 (1959). See also
Weisbrod & Hansen, An Income-Net Worth Approach to Measuring Economic Welfare, 58
AMER..ECON. REV. 1315 (1968) (conversion of wealth into lifetime annuity; this method ex-
hausts wealth rather than measure the security provided by wealth).
"If the tax is a direct tax but not a tax on income, it must be apportioned among the
states according to population. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9 and amend. XVI.
"See generally Tanabe, The taxation of Net Wealth, in R. BIRD & 0. OOLDMAN, READING
ON TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 281, 288-89 (rev. ed. 1967); Thurow, New Worth
Taxes, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 417, 422-23 (1972); Wheatcroft, The Administrative Problems of a
Wealth Tax, 1963 BRIT. TAX REV. 410.
"Concerning wealth taxation, see generally C. SANDFORD, TAXING PERSONAL WEALTH
178-79 (1971); N. KALDOR. INDIAN TAX REFORM 20 (1956); Tanabe, supra note 83, at 283;
Thurow, supra note 83, at 417; Andrews, supra note 1, at 1170-72; Andrews, What's Fair
About Death Taxes?, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 465 (1973).
"Inequality in taxing personal insurance already exists because insurance purchased by
employers is often tax free to employees. See I.R.C. § 79 (group term life insurance) and
I.R.C. § 106 (medical and disability insurance).
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payer's personal sphere of activity because they protect against the nor-
mal risks of everyday personal life; (3) that this fact alone is insufficient
to justify their taxation because the activities giving rise to the expenses
do not express particular life-style choices, which in our society seems to
be the standard for defining taxable consumption; (4) that personal
insurance premiums should nonetheless be taxable, because they express
a particular preference for economic security in the conduct of personal
life; with the proviso (5) that there is an element of unfairness in taxing
security purchased through insurance if security is untaxed when it is
derived from wealth.
